First person: Frank Turner

Dec. 28, 2000
Frank Turner is a man who should need no introduction. However, this self-effacing man-Turner begins most sentences with the pronoun "we," as in "We decided to . . ." when it was really Turner's decision-is virtually unknown outside this industry, yet Americans continually reap the fruits of his labor.
Frank Turner is a man who should need no introduction. However, this self-effacing man-Turner begins most sentences with the pronoun "we," as in "We decided to . . ." when it was really Turner's decision-is virtually unknown outside this industry, yet Americans continually reap the fruits of his labor. More than any other individual, Frances "Frank" Turner can rightly claim the title of "Father of the Interstate Highway System."

Turner's relative anonymity is as much a function of his personal modesty as it is of the forum in which he spent his life: The federal government. While many people can identify Alexandre-Gustave Eiffel as the designer of Paris' landmark tower, how many can name the chief engineer of a well-known and massive public works project such as Hoover Dam?

Government employees tend to toil in relative obscurity, working in the shadows created by the footlights that bathe the politicians they work under. After all, Herbert Hoover really didn't have anything to do with the construction of the then-Boulder Dam. Yet the structure was renamed for the politician in 1947, to honor a public works advocate and the nation's most visible civil engineer.

The interstate highway system is a similar case. While the official nomenclature for the 43,500-mile-long system is the "Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways," work on such a system was well into the planning stage before the World War II hero assumed presidential office in 1953. And it was largely through the efforts of men like Turner that Eisenhower's desire for an autobahn-style system in America became a reality.

Perhaps large government projects, such as the interstate system, need larger-than-life heroes like Eisenhower to champion them. In order to "sell" such a project, there has to be a focus, and it is much easier for the average American to identify with a five-star war veteran than with those low-profile troops that serve under such a leader.

But these troops are not forgotten by the roads and bridges industry. This February, The American Highway Users Alliance (AHUA) President William D. Fay addressed attendees at the American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials' annual Washington, D.C., briefing. Fay noted the upcoming 40th anniversary of the interstate system and spoke of the association's plan to honor those who made the system possible. "We're planning a June event for policy makers in Washington," he said, "that will honor Susan Eisenhower, standing in for her grandfather; Al Gore Sr., who sponsored the Senate bill; and Frank Turner-who I'm told built the whole damn thing."

Turner's name may not be attached to the system he made possible, but-to the discerning eye-his imprint is on all 43,500 miles of one of the most ambitious and
successful public works projects ever.

Turner was raised in Texas, whose residents are known for their big ideas and big talk. While he appears unaffected by the latter, Turner's career does point out his ability to envision-and execute-large projects.

"I started with the Bureau of Public Roads-which later became the Federal Highway Administration-upon graduation from Texas A&M in 1929," Turner recalls. "Yes, just in time for the depression." His ability to handle complex projects impressed supervisors, and, in the early days of World War II, Turner worked on key military highways in the often forbidding Alaskan landscape, sometimes scouting terrain from light aircraft.

Following Japan's surrender in 1945, Turner was sent on another war-related mission, a national-scale project that helped prepare him for the U.S. interstate effort: He was sent to oversee the reconstruction of the Philippine's highway system.

"It was a massive reconstruction project," Turner notes. "Bridges of almost all sizes on the 7,000 islands that make up the Philippine archipelago were either severely damaged or destroyed by the Japanese. Those that weren't damaged by them were damaged by our soldiers to make it difficult for the Japanese to continue their efforts there.

"There were over 500 bridges to rebuild; I was out there almost four years. I returned to the United States in 1950, when the highway work was largely done, but others were there for about 10 more years. I made about four trips back to the Philippines to check on the progress over the years."

Less than three years later, the former Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe during World War II-five-star Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower-was swept into office in a burst of patriotic fever. A former military man who assumed the presidency as the Cold War was beginning to heat up, Eisenhower drew on his "highway experience" in both the U.S. and Germany to envision a U.S. highway system that could help both the military and citizenry during times of war.

"When Eisenhower was elected in 1952, one of his goals was to improve the major highway system in the U.S., based largely on his convoy experience in the U.S. after World War I. Added to that was his German autobahn experience in the second world war-he'd seen that from a military standpoint. One of his major goals was to build a similar-better-road system here during his administration. This program was announced and organized, to be led by Gen. Clay."

"General Clay" was Gen. Lucius Clay, Eisenhower's handpicked director. Turner explains why the new president chose this military man, and how the wheels of history turned to place Turner himself in such a decisive role. "Clay was one of Eisenhower's chief assistants during the war and after, so Eisenhower nominated Clay to succeed him in Europe when he returned to the U.S. So Clay was the obvious choice to work under him back here.

"I was to the committee what Clay was to Eisenhower in Europe; I was actually kind of a glorified 'gofer,' " Turner adds with characteristic modesty. "It was suggested that the program be handled by the Bureau of Public Roads, as we had already gotten a start on the program to study the feasibility of a nationwide highway system. At that time, I was assistant to the commissioner of the Bureau of Public Roads, so I was assigned to work with Gen. Clay. I don't even remember my official title there; we were a very 'hey you' type of organization, very informal, gofers doing the actual work. But we were very professional; we had a lot of sharp individuals working with us.

"The data we had collected for the feasibility study was used to put together the Clay Committee Report. The official name of the program was 'The Committee for a National Highway Program,' but everyone called it the Clay Committee. It was presidentially appointed, and we made a special effort to tie it to the White House."

Ties of this kind served two purposes: As a war hero, President Dwight "I Like Ike" Eisenhower was enjoying enormous popularity, and any program linked to him would enjoy a certain measure of this public approval. At the same time, Eisenhower could share credit for the program's success.

While Eisenhower can claim credit for finally "forcing" the issue of an Interstate Highway System, Turner says the concept had been under investigation-in one form or another-for more than 30 years.

"The effort was very much underway before Eisenhower took office. The material we used for the report's data had been set up by legislation approved by Congress in the early '50s; legislation passed in 1944 actually started it all. It was an outgrowth of the depression-era work; [President Franklin Delano] Roosevelt had proposed a massive highway system. One of the pushes was to establish programs that would allow Americans to have work-not paid much, but something-and to improve the highway system. Legislation passed in 1944 pushed this further, not only to assist the growing economy, but the war was coming to a close-it was clear at that time. With 11 million men in uniform and the war soon to be over, what were we going to do with all these men when they returned? There was that concern.

"It was only because of the accumulation of all this data that we were able to get this material together so quickly for the Clay Committee report. Time estimates, dollar figures and things like that had already been calculated, so it was really just a matter of 'turning the switch on' to obtain it. Actually, more than 30 years of preparation went into that report. It wasn't called an 'interstate system' then, but we had data and maps put together as far back as 1921 to show how the nation could all be connected. So we built off all of that."

Committee members also built off Eisenhower's idealized concept of an "American autobahn," but with one important distinction: "The German autobahn was built purely for military purposes. One of the major differences between that and what we were thinking was that the autobahn was built in rural areas-it bypassed cities. It even had areas where it was designed to do 'double duty': parts were major landing strips for aircraft. As I've said, the autobahn was for purely military use.

"We had already been through that in the 1930s, the exercise of a military highway system and taking a look at what that would require. But now, with the Clay Committee, we looked at the needs of most Americans. One of the major problems was in the city, not the country. This is where travel was difficult; congestion high. So we needed roads both between cities and to penetrate into cities because that is where the most miles are driven. That is where the need was.

"So our concept was to go through-not around-cities. This is something that Eisenhower, as a military man, had trouble understanding. He probably would not have seen the need for city 'interstates' as easily as others because of this background."

One of the criticisms often leveled at the interstate system is its effect on the cities these highways don't penetrate. Nearly a hundred years earlier, towns on the Great Plains withered and died like fruit on a severed vine after being bypassed by the railroad. When the interstate highway system began to make inroads into America, the same scenario was repeated.

"We knew that cities would be hurt by being bypassed. That is one of the reasons we did not go around them, as the autobahn did, but chose to penetrate into the city. And not just through the city, but to provide a route to specific points inside the city. That would aid commerce. You need to be able to get the trucks into the cities-right up to the loading dock. You can't just have them go up to the city limits and have them dump their loads there. You have to build into the cities.

"JIT,"-which Turner pronounces as one word-"or 'just in time'shipping is now possible because of our interstate system. This has completely changed the American economy. There is a tremendous difference between this and what would have occurred if we had not decided to have the interstates have this penetration. Milk delivered overnight, food from out West-we take this for granted today."

Unfortunately, the direct route of the "penetrations" often took the planned roads over established homes, businesses and ways of life. Turner says the committee listened to all points of view and tried to persuade both Congress and the public to accept what they felt was a just compromise when national and private interests clashed.

But conflict was inevitable. The construction of the interstate system required the acquisition of more than three-quarters of a million parcels of land; many had to be acquired through the process of eminent domain. Needless to say, this was often an unpopular procedure.

"The public had all sorts of opinions-from A to Z-about the interstate; some objections, naturally. But we went to great lengths to alleviate personal difficulties the roads created.

"The first concern was to make sure the personal disruption that a roadway's construction created was necessary to meet acceptable service levels. But that's difficult; how do you go about determining that? And how do you provide relief for those who will be displaced by the roads?

"We set up committees in Congress and performed studies to determine what is 'necessary,' as well as what is fair for the average Americans who were affected by the construction-this is the contribution we made to alleviate these problems. We had great discussions and debates about this, especially with the budget office-they were opposed to helping these folks. They basically said, 'Tough luck for them; it is part of being in America.'

"We didn't share that view, and we set up groups to study the 'other side of the coin' so to speak, and we came up with legislation that would buy out people who were damaged or would be damaged by the routes through cities and make them 'whole' again. Finally, we established a system where those displaced got 20% over the appraised value of their homes, or we would move them-at our expense-to a location of their choice.

"We got a lot of growls out of some people for that-especially from the budget office-but it was the fair thing to do. Today this is pretty much a standard procedure, but it was somewhat controversial back then."

Turner was able to experience-almost firsthand-that "other side of the coin": One of the homes in the path of I­p;45 through Texas was that of Turner's parents. "I didn't even know about it until it was underway. I was coming back from a trip to the Philippines, and-when I arrived at their house in Fort Worth-I saw a surveyor's stake right in the middle of the driveway. So I knew something was going on. My parents just said, 'We have to move,' and that was it. I didn't have anything to do with it. They sold their house to the state; the state then resold it so someone who had it moved. My folks bought an existing house in a different part of the city.

"They later said-and I agree with them-that they came out ahead through this program.

"The whole idea of this relocation program was to try to help. For a number of years, we went back to talk to people who had been relocated by the process to see what their opinion was that year vs. in the past. To see how their feelings had changed over time. From talking to them, most people were mad as hell in the beginning, but later they would say, 'To be honest, we are better off now than we were before.' As I've said, this is now an accepted principle, at least in the federal government, to make proper recompense. But-back then-there was tremendous opposition."

In addition to opposition from the dislocated individuals themselves, opposition came from those who didn't want to extend "benefits" to those inconvenienced by the ambitious project. Like any government or business under-taking, all parties involved took a hard look at the bottom line. How to fund such a large bottom line was another source of lively debate.

"Funding was a major area of study and review. At the same time, separate from the highway studies, Congress had ordered a study on whether we should build a national system of toll roads. There were a few at the time; the Pennsylvania Turnpike was the granddaddy of them all. But you could be on those roads and not see another car for hours, while on the other roads you'd constantly be on someone's bumper.

"Why not fund the interstates this way? We ran this study and concluded it was a way to do it, but not the better way. It had a lot of problems. For one, it is much more costly this way-bonds, toll plazas and so on.

"We were required to update that tollway study as part of the interstate study; we reached the same conclusion-it was a feasible method but probably not the best way to run things. However, it was the toll road concept that was picked up by the Clay Committee-even though we reached the opposite conclusion. The recommendation Eisenhower sent to Congress was to build a system financed by bonds-to set up a federal corporation to sell 30-year treasury bonds, paid for by tolls or taxes, primarily tolls.

"This proposal did not receive favorable treatment in Congress; they rejected it by a large margin because of this. But we were still able to begin the program, using funds authorized in '52 and '53. We got things going.

"We did have a federal fuel tax at the time; some states have had them since the early '30s; Oregon was the first to have one, I think, back in 1931 or '32. But the fuel tax went into the general fund, not just for highways. So this is one concept that was discussed; it was the one favored by Congress.

"We set up the program as it was finally approved in 1956; the legislation Eisenhower signed set up the Highway Trust Fund, into which the statutory tax items would go, the big item of which was the tax on fuel. When we began, it was 2 cents, and I spent nights arguing with members of Congress on whether to raise it 1¦4 , 1¦2 or a full cent. We finally settled on a fuel tax of 3 cents.

"The concept was that the tax would be adequate to fund the program, but it would only be levied on items that were used in connection with highway travel-gasoline, primarily. Purchase of gas for other uses-such as in 5-gal cans for motorboats-would not be taxed. Yes, individuals would have to be taxed up front, but they could get forms to get reimbursed for that tax payment. This is how the bill went through.

"We thought this was a fair way of doing it, and it prevailed without much opposition. Actually, without a single opposition vote. When we first put the bill together, it exempted rubber-tired mass transit vehicles, because we didn't feel it would be fair to tax those who really didn't use the highways or couldn't afford to pay for it.

"One of the cornerstones of the entire interstate highway system was that the cost of the system would be paid for by user fees. This concept was violated in the 1960s, and it continues to this day.

"Government has shut its eyes to diverting the fund to nonhighway uses, such as mass transit. We put a lot of work into an interstate program that would be paid for by the users, and those who did not use it wouldn't have to pay a cent of it. At least, they would be able to get their money back in rebates if they didn't use the system.We thought that was a pretty fair way to run the government; still think so.

"Therefore, the use of the Highway Trust Fund for other types of transportation is a violation of that trust; this was violated beginning in the 1960s, and that hurt, it really did. While this entire program passed overwhelmingly back in the 1950s, there have been some longtime opponents to it, and they have succeeded in raiding the program in recent years. I don't think Mr. and Mrs. America are aware of it; if they were, they would be as mad as hell. Mass transit is getting a free ride."

Turner takes the "trust" in the Highway Trust Fund literally; he finds the appropriation of the trust's funds by programs such as mass transit to be a violation of the "pay as you go" program he helped guide through Congress, as well as breach of the covenant between government and the people. Beginning in 1968, the year before he took the helm of the Federal Highway Administration, the fund was put "on budget," and portions of the fuel-tax revenues began to support mass transit systems, money that otherwise would have gone to fund interstate construction and maintenance.

While Turner is largely responsible for the very existence of the interstate system, he does not let his emotions carry him away. He is willing to back up his comment that "mass transit is getting a free ride" with facts, not just feelings.

"I did a study with a couple of other fellows, a worldwide study on a consulting basis after I retired. We saw mass transit systems all over the world, took notes on them all, and what we found is that not one city can pay for its transit system. The riders pay for only approximately 30% of their ride; the rest is subsidized.

"Now, some cities believe that mass transit is the answer, and for some cities, it is. We are not opposed to this; highways are not the answer for everyone. But you have to look at where the people are really traveling. In 1991, 90% of travel miles were highway miles. Travel is very much overloaded on the highway side.

"The Washington Metra system is the best in the world; I use it when it goes where I need to go, but that isn't always the case. [Mass transit] is not convenient for most folks. A study found that the commute is not just home to work and then back again. There is an average of three to five stops there; with more women entering the workforce, there will be more need for errands to be run during commutes. People stop and drop off dry cleaning, take the kids to school, pick up a loaf of bread. Mass transit does not accommodate this well."

Turner details other social dynamics that are making mass transit less necessary and highways more attractive. He sees the two-career household as an American institution that is here to stay; with more people in the workplace, there are more commuters on the road to more places. And many of today's commuters are somehow tied to computers, which are revolutionizing the way we work. Today, it's not uncommon to work at "computer centers," satellite stations only a few miles from the home and not necessarily in downtown areas or near a company's physical location. The virtual office, too, is becoming an American fixture. Only roadways are flexible enough to accommodate these commuters.

"We need to privatize some of this, such as car pooling and the van system that the 3M company uses up in St. Paul, Minn. The company buys the vans and leases them to an individual who gets other riders-along the same route-to share the ride. This has been a very successful program for them; the only change they have had to make is that they have had to cut back to smaller vans, because people are more spread out, and there are fewer individuals on a given route.

"Also, we don't need the magnificent facilities-I'm not joking there-that some mass transit systems have. We need to go back to 'less.' We don't need all the trackage, all the automated controls, all the impressive stations."

But above all, we do need the highways. While Turner reluctantly acknowledges the tremendous impact his work has had on America, he is unwilling to say such a vast under-taking is out of reach for today's highway planners. As always, Turner has an eye on the future and confidence in his support of interstates.

"The highway system has to be continually improved and replaced every minute of every day, and that is a large project in itself. We have to keep upgrading to make it better and safer. We have made tremendous strides in this direction; we need to continue this effort. There is a tremendous return on investment from that viewpoint.

"We need to keep the highway system up-there is more to it than just people going to work. Most of our freight is on the highway; this is going to continue to be our predominant mode of product transport. Rails carry only 22% of the materials volume, I think, and this is mainly bulk items-coal, grain and things like that. Except for boxed items in boxcars, trucks on the highway is the primary mode of transporting manufactured goods.

"We need to provide extensions of the miles of road, and we need to maintain what we have. If you look at the heavy traffic we're seeing on existing roads-with the steadily increasing volumes, weights and all-we're not even keeping up with this growth.

"There is a life to a mile of highway, about 30 to 35 years, I would say, and the average age of the interstates' miles is getting to the point where overloads, cracks and other deterioration are all really showing.

"We need to be thinking about the ways to get to and from where we need to go; mass transit systems don't work that way. They are too inflexible."

The future, to Turner, is based firmly on the foundation he helped lay in the '50s and '60s-only roadways can accommodate the flexible needs of a continually evolving workplace and economy.

Frank Turner officially retired in 1972, but it takes only a very short conversation with him to realize he's never left work. Not only does he have his finger on the pulse of today's highways, he is-at 87 years of age-looking far into the future of transportation. While he may never become a household name, his efforts have made such a significant impact on the American way of life that American Heritage magazine, on the occasion of its own 40th anniversary in 1994, named Turner one of the "Ten People Who Changed the Way You Live."

The article was subtitled "(You've Never Heard of Any of Them)," but that appears to suit the modest Turner just fine. The Interstate Highway System was the largest public works project in history, a $130 billion endeavor that included over 15,000 interchanges and 54,000 bridges. More than just an engineering triumph, the system changed the way Americans lived: By bringing the "interstates" right into the city, it allowed an easy flow of commerce and made it possible for individuals to see parts of the country that were all but inaccessible before its construction. It literally put America and Americans in the driver's seat.

Always understating his own efforts, the "Father of the Interstate Highway System" will only admit that, "The highways have changed the way we live to a certain degree."

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