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  • Incident Management

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    System is needed to quickly heal bottlenecks when accidents happen
    Can we encounter an incident that does not delay our arrival to our final destination?

    - BY MONICA MENENDEZ, E.I.T. AND CARLOS DAGANZO, PH.D

    By understanding how the effects of incidents depend on their magnitude, duration and location, we can design better detection and removal strategies. Here, we compare two basic approaches: a system that uses “on-call” tow trucks for incident removal, with a separate surveillance method (e.g., video cameras) for detection; and a system that integrates detection and removal using roving trucks. The results suggest how to best allocate freeway surveillance and assistance resources. The benefits can be considerable.

    Why the delay?

    Is this scenario realistic or totally outrageous? Can we encounter an incident that does not delay our arrival to our final destination? Or, more dramatically, are there incidents that do not delay anyone? The answer to this question is yes. The incident must happen inside a queue caused by a recurrent bottleneck, and be of such short duration that it does not affect the bottleneck discharge rate—its capacity—at any point in time. This is not an easy thing for drivers to verify individually. But any driver who is late in passing through the bottleneck as a result of the incident can conclude that the incident was serious enough to cause a delay—not just to him or her, but to following drivers too. Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of an incident upstream of a bottleneck.

    Critical conditions

    Figures 2a and 2b are time-space diagrams for two scenarios depicting an incident upstream of a bottleneck. The diagrams follow the most basic theory of traffic flow. The black dotted lines are vehicle trajectories; the continuous lines are waves (propagation of traffic disturbances where vehicles change speeds); and the red lines are trajectories of selected vehicles, with and without the incident (i.e., actual and theoretical trajectories). Figure 2a shows a short-duration (sub-critical) incident. The typical vehicle suffers no delay at all, since it passes the bottleneck at the same time with and without the incident (i.e., the actual and theoretical vehicle trajectories meet before reaching the bottleneck). This turns out to be true for all vehicles if the traffic void in between the waves downstream of the incident does not reach the bottleneck, as occurs in our figure. Therefore, the flow through the bottleneck is never disrupted by the incident of Figure 2a.

    Figure 2b shows the same incident, but with a longer (super-critical) duration. Now, the waves from the incident reach the bottleneck and reduce its flow during a starvation period. This delays every vehicle that passes the bottleneck after the beginning of the starvation period, as shown by the actual and theoretical trajectories of Figure 2b, which never meet. The incident creates “generalized” delays, which linger for the duration of the rush.

    Figure 2 reveals that the critical duration increases with the incident’s distance from the bottleneck. It should now be evident that all incidents are not created equal, and that some deserve more urgent attention than others. If incidents are removed quickly enough, they do not cause any extra delay. But, if their duration exceeds a critical time the effects last for the whole rush hour. This critical time depends on the characteristics of the highway (e.g., jam density, free-flow speed, bottleneck capacity and highway capacity) and the characteristics of the incident (e.g., magnitude and location).

    On the other hand, the extra delay per vehicle caused by an incident depends on three things:

    • Detection time: Time it takes to detect the incident;
    • Approach time: Time the roadside assistance vehicle takes to reach the incident location; and
    • Removal time: Time the roadside assistance vehicle takes to physically remove the incident.

    For an incident not to cause generalized delays, the sum of these three times should not exceed the critical time. Since this critical time increases linearly with the incident’s distance to the bottleneck, incidents closer to the bottleneck are more likely to cause generalized delay than more distant ones.

    There are, in general, two possible scenarios. When incidents are really close to the bottleneck, it is almost certain they will affect the bottleneck and reduce its discharge rate. Let us assume there is a tow truck next to the incident when it happens, so that the detection and approach times are zero. Nonetheless, we still have to physically remove the incident. If this would exceed the critical time, a fast response (detection plus approach) time is critical because every minute saved reduces the starvation period by an equal amount. On the other hand, if an incident occurs so far from the bottleneck that generalized delays can be avoided with a slow response, the agency can act with more of a cushion.

    In need of a tow

    We consider here a homogeneous section of a highway (a link) directly upstream of a bottleneck, as in Figure 1, and two incident-management strategies.

    On-Call Tow Trucks

    Here, a single roadside assistance vehicle is stationed at an optimal location, to be determined, and a separate surveillance system (e.g., video cameras) detects all incidents instantaneously. We want to find the location that will minimize the average extra delay across many days. This optimal location depends on the length of the link and the incident magnitude.

    If the link is so short that all the incidents are super-critical then the truck should be positioned at the upstream end and no optimization is required. For longer links, one should take advantage of the cushions for remote incidents. The optimal location is no longer at the upstream end. In both cases, it is possible to evaluate the average extra delay.

    Roving Tow Trucks

    With this strategy, multiple assistance vehicles travel in a loop and double up as surveillance equipment. There is no location to optimize. The average approach time at every point is uniformly distributed with values between zero and the time headway. From here we can calculate the average extra delay caused by incidents, which increases rapidly with the headway. Since the headway between trucks is proportional to link length, we see that the average extra delay also increases rapidly with link length.

    To compare the two strategies we must balance the costs of extra roving trucks with the costs of surveillance. Figures 3 and 4 show the number of roving trucks required to offer the same service level as with Strategy A. For example, Strategy B with three roving trucks is worse than strategy A if the cost of operating two trucks is higher than the surveillance cost.

    For the example below we use a single link of different lengths (0.25-3 miles), located directly upstream of the bottleneck. In both strategies we assume, for simplicity, that the assistance vehicles travel at a constant speed of 25 mph while on the link, and at a different constant speed, 15 mph, while outside (traveling to the upstream end of the link to reposition themselves). The lower speed accounts for the fact that trucks have to travel a longer distance while repositioning than while inside the link. Note that the assistance vehicles do not serve any other link while repositioning.

    The removal time is set to two different values: Five minutes if the incident is removed quickly and 20 minutes if the incident is removed slowly. Finally, the magnitude of the incident is set to two different levels: small and large. Similarly, the two curves account for different bottleneck sizes: Not severe (where the capacity of the bottleneck is very similar to that of the highway) and severe (where the bottleneck capacity is 30% that of the highway). The graphs were developed by applying the procedures mentioned above to typical U.S. freeways.

    The results shown in these graphs are very revealing. In most of the cases the number of roving trucks is well above two. Moreover, when the capacity of the bottleneck is similar to that of the highway, the number of trucks does not vary much with the length of the link. In addition, the number of roving trucks is generally larger for short removal times and/or less severe incidents.

    From this example we can conclude that very often a separate surveillance system reduces the number of roadside assistance vehicles by more than 50% (i.e., to provide the same service as with one on-call truck and a separate surveillance system we usually need two or more roving trucks). This suggests that a widespread use of on-call trucks and a separate surveillance system might bring substantial benefits. Nevertheless, this only represents one specific case. In real life we would have incidents of different magnitudes and a variable removal time. In that case the optimal solution might not be unique, but it should, evidently, be of the same nature as this one.

    Nowadays, most of the departments of transportation recognize the significance of incidents near recurrent bottlenecks. This work can help to mitigate their disruptive effects. Agencies can now categorize incidents according to their location, magnitude and duration. They also can design efficient response strategies to improve the allocation of their resources.




    Menendez is a Ph.D student at the University of California, Berkeley. Daganzo is the Robert Horonjeff Professor of civil and environmental engineering at the University of California, Berkeley

    Source: TM+E   July 2004   Volume: 9 Number: 3
    Copyright © 2008 Scranton Gillette Communications



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