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    Improving Light Rail Safety & Security

       Terms & Conditions of Use

    Measures to secure safety of passengers
    Two decades of light rail development provide a suitable milestone at which an assessment of safety and security can be objectively addressed. Standards and rules, such as the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices, state regulations and local building codes have been applied to engineering design, as has the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. System-related operational procedures have been adopted.

    - J. Peter Cunliffe, P.E.

    Two decades of light rail development provide a suitable milestone at which an assessment of safety and security can be objectively addressed. According to the U.S. DOT statistics, in 1998, light rail covered 659 directional route miles with 530 stations, in 23 systems, having a total of 1,205 vehicles, carrying 275 million unlinked passenger miles. Since that time, several more LRT systems have been constructed both in the U.S. and overseas.

    Standards and rules, such as the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices, state regulations and local building codes have been applied to engineering design, as has the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. System-related operational procedures have been adopted.

    However, as LRT projects are isolated and independent, variations have occurred and will do so again as others are implemented.

     

    Safety review

    Now that the transportation industry has had real-time experience of LRT, it is appropriate to review some problems that have arisen in operating systems, which have lead to unsafe conditions, accidents, injuries and property damage, followed by consequential litigation.

    Some of these may have resulted from faulty basic design of the system itself, which may or may not have been foreseen when the configuration was established.

    Rather than being a form of criticism, this article is offered from real-world operational experience to improve the future security and safety of the traveling public, as well as to prevent litigation as the result of incidents. It is based on my experience of actual events that have taken place. The object is to prevent recurrence in the future wherever possible.

     

    Incident report

    Open Stations: This feature of LRT gives rise to people jumping the tracks in front of trains; stepping on the rough ballast; ignoring warnings, etc. In some instances, fences have been erected as a form of crowd control.

     

    Island Platforms: These force the traveling public to cross at least one track to access the train. This procedure is an inherently dangerous condition. Even with gates and other deterrent devices, pedestrians are free to wander, even without thought to their own safety.

     

    Highway Signals: Use of highway-type signs and signals for pedestrians lead to confusion, being not relative to foot or wheelchair traffic.

     

    Grade Crossings: Associated pedestrian crosswalks, controlled by the highway warning devices, have been omitted, forcing pedestrians dangerously to divert their itinerary into road traffic lanes.

     

    Coupler Jumping: Due to the extended space between coupled cars on some systems, and the lack of proper warnings or preventative devices, pedestrians have been known to pass between cars, jumping the couplers, thereby causing injuries—this is particularly dangerous when the train is moving. More than an estimated 6,000 such incidents occur annually on the San Diego system.

     

    Stations on a Curved Track: Operators need to have maximum views of both sides of the train along the platforms. Only then can they ensure safety of passengers and anything else that is taking place between them. Specially designed mirrors provide a solution to this problem.

     

    Wheelchair Accommodation: While transit systems are obligated to provide accommodations for the disabled, once a wheelchair is in the vehicle, and in the space provided for it, the occupant can still move and the wheelchair can shift. Tie-downs or anchors for wheelchairs in transit cars do not exist as they do in paratransit vehicles—a check with the Federal Transit Administration confirms that there are no such requirements.

     

    Handholds: To prevent passengers from stumbling or falling within a vehicle, it is important that integral handholds be provided and easily accessible. They may be in the form of suspended straphangers, part of a seat or horizontal/vertical bars.

     

    Trespass: Unfenced LRT systems are subject to trespass, as are railroads. System design should not ignore this hazard, especially in areas subject to high activity, which encourages vandalism as well as deliberate sabotage.

     

    Signalization: Main-line signal systems as applied to light rail transit have not, as far as is known, caused any safety related incident. However, street movement of LRT vehicles requires special attention. Road traffic signals must be coordinated with LRT not only in regard to vehicular, but also pedestrian traffic. Preemption is an important element in the design of such systems so as to ensure the safe movement of all modes.

     

    Preemption Control: In order to expedite light rail operations at road and/or pedestrian intersections, preemption is usually built into the control arrangements. Here again, timing is important, especially to provide clearance of crossing occupation prior to light rail vehicle movement over the crossing and to hold the rail vehicle until the crossing has been signaled to stop. The MUTCD and the CALTRANS Traffic Manual address this question. This is especially important in regard to pedestrians and their special characteristics at the location concerned. These include elderly and disabled persons, school children, rush hour traffic, etc., accustomed to use the particular location.

     

    Pedestrians: Pedestrians generally are unpredictable, but they are the LRT system’s payload and revenue. Their safety is a predominant feature of any light rail system, therefore, although their safety must be ensured, their access to the system must be encouraged and facilitated.

     

    Personnel

    Operator Competence: One single operator is responsible for perhaps hundreds of lives. Therefore, it is essential that all those responsible for ensuring operator competence have the necessary qualifications and experience to make the judgment and to reject, without qualms, an unsuitable applicant or existing employee. This includes safety personnel actually in charge of a train and supervision of their proper behavior in accordance with a clear set of rules and regulations as well as operating procedures, both of which must be updated as necessary.

     

    Management: Notwithstanding all hardware and other safeguards provided in an LRT system, the safe operation ultimately depends on individuals, all of whom, from management to the lowest employee on the totem pole, should be competent and careful. This responsibility starts at the top, continues through the management structure through all concerned, especially safety personnel. This, of course, is an obvious statement and applies to most businesses, but it is all the more important where the lives of people is in their hands and should never be forgotten. Constant vigilance by management is essential for a safe system, and this applies to recruitment and employment of staff.

     

    The Rule Book: This important document should be reviewed periodically by management—also requiring similar treatment are such instructions as standard operating procedures; drug policy; and maintenance instructions, including updates and changes.

     

    Supervisory Staff: Delegation of responsibility for safety, among other things, is essential, but those concerned must be chosen for their reliability—slack or irresponsible attitude is unacceptable. Such staff should also be held responsible for any foreseeable mishaps or accidents relevant either to the system or to the public. It is not sufficient to simply ride the trains, they must be trained to anticipate trouble, recommend solutions and, above all, follow up to ensure action is taken.

     

    Medical: The medical condition of safety systems employees is a critical element in the safe operation of a transportation system, including light rail. Therefore the use, possession or sale of alcoholic beverages, intoxicants, narcotics or controlled substances must be prohibited, and checked to be so before taking up, and during duty.

     

    Conclusion

    Ever since transportation systems have been in operation, accidents have occurred. And although the results have, in some cases, been disastrous, the positive side is that they have led to remedial action and improved safety.

    It is therefore logical that, although experience of so-called light rail in its present form is relatively short, the industry would be well advised to take stock periodically to review accidents and unsafe incidents to improve safety overall in this rapidly developing popular system of people transport.     TME




    J. Peter Cunliffe is president of Movement Control Inc., consulting engineers in ground transportation systems engineering in Newport Beach, Calif.

    Source: TM+E   August-September 2002   Volume: 7 Number: 4
    Copyright © 2008 Scranton Gillette Communications


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